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The genesis of On Certainty was Wittgenstein's "long interest" in two famous papers by G. E. Moore, his 1939 Proof of the External World and earlier Defence of Common Sense (1925). [2] Wittgenstein thought the latter was Moore's "best article", but despite that he did not think Moore's 'proof' of external reality decisive.
Culture and Value is a selection from the personal notes of Ludwig Wittgenstein made by Georg Henrik von Wright.It was first published in German as Vermischte Bemerkungen in 1977 with the text being emended in following editions.
Wittgenstein offers a subtle objection to Moore's argument in passage #554 of On Certainty. Considering "I know", he says "In its language-game it is not presumptuous ('nicht anmassend')," so that even if P implies Q, knowing P is true doesn't necessarily entail knowing Q. Moore has displaced "I know.."
Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty. Oxford University Press, 1994; Introductory Readings In Philosophy. Avrum Stroll, Richard H. Popkin. Harcourt Brace* Co, November 1997; Skeptical Philosophy for Everyone. Richard H. Popkin, Avrum Stroll. Prometheus Books, January 2002, Hardcover; Wittgenstein (Oneworld Philosophers). Oneworld Publications ...
On Certainty is a series of notes made by Ludwig Wittgenstein just prior to his death. The main theme of the work is that context plays a role in epistemology. Wittgenstein asserts an anti-foundationalist message throughout the work: that every claim can be doubted but certainty is possible in a framework.
However, Wittgenstein took the line that 'There is indeed no such thing as phenomenology, but there are phenomenological problems.' [5] He was content to regard Goethe's observations as a kind of logic or geometry. Wittgenstein took some of his examples from the Runge letter included at the end of the "Farbenlehre", e.g. "White is the lightest ...
Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (/ ˈ v ɪ t ɡ ən ʃ t aɪ n,-s t aɪ n / VIT-gən-s(h)tyne, [7] Austrian German: [ˈluːdvɪk ˈjoːsɛf ˈjoːhan ˈvɪtɡn̩ʃtaɪn]; 26 April 1889 – 29 April 1951) was an Austrian philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.
Form of life (German: Lebensform) is a term used sparingly by Ludwig Wittgenstein in posthumously published works Philosophical Investigations (PI), On Certainty and in parts of his Nachlass. [1] Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) was concerned with the structure of language, responding to Frege and Russell.