Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
Miller defined two main classes of monotonicity failure in 2012, which have been repeated in later papers: [14] [6] Upward monotonicity failure: Given the use of voting method V and a ballot profile B in which candidate X is the winner, X may nevertheless lose in ballot profile B' that differs from B only in that some voters rank X higher in B' than in B
Woodall's plurality criterion is a voting criterion for ranked voting. It is stated as follows: [ 68 ] [ 69 ] If the number of ballots ranking A as the first preference is greater than the number of ballots on which another candidate B is given any preference [other than last], then A's probability of winning must be no less than B's.
In the context of search algorithms monotonicity (also called consistency) is a condition applied to heuristic functions. A heuristic h ( n ) {\displaystyle h(n)} is monotonic if, for every node n and every successor n' of n generated by any action a , the estimated cost of reaching the goal from n is no greater than the step cost of getting to ...
APV satisfies the monotonicity criterion, the participation criterion and the consistency criterion. It does not satisfy the Condorcet loser criterion, the independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion, the independence of clones criterion or reversal symmetry.
The most common cause of no-show paradoxes is the use of instant-runoff (often called ranked-choice voting in the United States).In instant-runoff voting, a no-show paradox can occur even in elections with only three candidates, and occur in 50%-60% of all 3-candidate elections where the results of IRV disagree with those of plurality.
Criterion A is "stronger" than B if satisfying A implies satisfying B. For instance, the Condorcet criterion is stronger than the majority criterion, because all majority winners are Condorcet winners. Thus, any voting method that satisfies the Condorcet criterion must satisfy the majority criterion.
STAR voting satisfies the monotonicity criterion, i.e. raising your vote's score for a candidate can never hurt their chances of winning, and lowering it can never help their chances. [28] [29] It also satisfies the resolvability criterion (in both Tideman and Woodall's versions). [citation needed]
Bucklin voting satisfies the majority criterion, the mutual majority criterion and the monotonicity criterion. [ 10 ] Bucklin voting without equal rankings allowed [ clarification needed ] fails the Condorcet criterion , independence of clones criterion , [ 11 ] later-no-harm , participation , consistency , reversal symmetry , the Condorcet ...