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Example Condorcet method voting ballot. Blank votes are equivalent to ranking that candidate last. A Condorcet method (English: / k ɒ n d ɔːr ˈ s eɪ /; French: [kɔ̃dɔʁsɛ]) is an election method that elects the candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates, whenever there is such a candidate.
Systems that guarantee the election of a Condorcet winners (when one exists) include Ranked Pairs, Schulze's method, and the Tideman alternative method. Methods that do not guarantee that the Cordorcet winner will be elected, even when one does exist, include instant-runoff voting (often called ranked-choice in the United States ), First-past ...
In voting systems, the Minimax Condorcet method is a single-winner ranked-choice voting method that always elects the majority (Condorcet) winner. [1] Minimax compares all candidates against each other in a round-robin tournament , then ranks candidates by their worst election result (the result where they would receive the fewest votes).
A voting system complying with the Condorcet loser criterion will never allow a Condorcet loser to win. A Condorcet loser is a candidate who can be defeated in a head-to-head competition against each other candidate. [11] (Not all elections will have a Condorcet loser since it is possible for three or more candidates to be mutually defeatable ...
The defeat-dropping Condorcet methods all look for a Condorcet winner, i.e. a candidate who is not defeated by any other candidate in a one-on-one majority vote. If there is no Condorcet winner, they repeatedly drop (set the margin to zero) for the one-on-one matchups that are closest to being tied, until there is a Condorcet winner.
The Schulze method (/ ˈ ʃ ʊ l t s ə /), also known as the beatpath method, is a single winner ranked-choice voting rule developed by Markus Schulze. The Schulze method is a Condorcet completion method , which means it will elect a majority-preferred candidate if one exists.
The authors showed that limiting any method to elections with no Condorcet winner (choosing the Condorcet winner when there was one) would never increase its susceptibility to tactical voting. They reported that the 'Condorcet-Hare' system which uses IRV as a tie-break for elections not resolved by the Condorcet criterion was as resistant to ...
The Kemeny-Young method satisfies ranking consistency; that is, if the electorate is divided arbitrarily into two parts and separate elections in each part result in the same ranking being selected, an election of the entire electorate also selects that ranking. In fact, it is the only Condorcet method that satisfies ranking consistency.