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Many operating systems implement or have an available executable space protection policy. Here is a list of such systems in alphabetical order, each with technologies ordered from newest to oldest. For some technologies, there is a summary which gives the major features each technology supports.
In ARMv6, a new page table entry format was introduced; it includes an "execute never" bit. [1] For ARMv8-A, VMSAv8-64 block and page descriptors, and VMSAv8-32 long-descriptor block and page descriptors, for stage 1 translations have "execute never" bits for both privileged and unprivileged modes, and block and page descriptors for stage 2 translations have a single "execute never" bit (two ...
With AppLocker, administrators are able to create rules based on file names, publishers or file location that will allow certain files to execute. Unlike the earlier Software Restriction Policies, which was originally available for Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, [2] AppLocker rules can apply to individuals or groups. Policies are used to ...
New default execution policy: On Windows Servers, the default execution policy is now RemoteSigned. Save-Help : Help can now be saved for modules that are installed on remote computers. Enhanced debugging : The debugger now supports debugging workflows, remote script execution and preserving debugging sessions across PowerShell session ...
Several computer systems introduced in the 1960s, such as the IBM System/360, DEC PDP-6/PDP-10, the GE-600/Honeywell 6000 series, and the Burroughs B5000 series and B6500 series, support two CPU modes; a mode that grants full privileges to code running in that mode, and a mode that prevents direct access to input/output devices and some other hardware facilities to code running in that mode.
Many of these attacks measure slight, nondeterministic variations in the execution of code, so the attacker needs many measurements (possibly tens of thousands) to learn secrets. However, the MicroScope attack allows a malicious OS to replay code an arbitrary number of times regardless of the program's actual structure, enabling dozens of side ...
With data execution prevention, an adversary cannot directly execute instructions written to a buffer because the buffer's memory section is marked as non-executable. To defeat this protection, a return-oriented programming attack does not inject malicious instructions, but rather uses instruction sequences already present in executable memory ...
Supervisor Mode Access Prevention is designed to complement Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMEP), which was introduced earlier. SMEP can be used to prevent supervisor mode from unintentionally executing user-space code. SMAP extends this protection to reads and writes. [2]