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In cryptography, a timing attack is a side-channel attack in which the attacker attempts to compromise a cryptosystem by analyzing the time taken to execute cryptographic algorithms. Every logical operation in a computer takes time to execute, and the time can differ based on the input; with precise measurements of the time for each operation ...
Exploiting a TOCTOU race condition requires precise timing to ensure that the attacker's operations interleave properly with the victim's. In the example above, the attacker must execute the symlink system call precisely between the access and open. For the most general attack, the attacker must be scheduled for execution after each operation ...
Meet-in-the-middle attack; Mod-n cryptanalysis; Related-key attack; Slide attack; XSL attack; Hash functions: Birthday attack; Attack models. Chosen-ciphertext; Chosen-plaintext; Ciphertext-only; Known-plaintext; Side channel attacks. Power analysis; Timing attack; Cold boot attack; Differential fault analysis; Network attacks Man-in-the-middle ...
A Lucky Thirteen attack is a cryptographic timing attack against implementations of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol that use the CBC mode of operation, first reported in February 2013 by its developers Nadhem J. AlFardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London. [1] [2]
Cache-timing attacks rely on the ability to infer hits and misses in shared caches on the web platform. [54] One of the first instances of a cache-timing attack involved the making of a cross-origin request to a page and then probing for the existence of the resources loaded by the request in the shared HTTP and the DNS cache.
Cache timing attacks also known as Cache attacks are a type of side-channel attack that allows attackers to gain information about a system purely by tracking cache access made by the victim system in a shared environment.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) claimed responsibility for the attack, the first time it took credit for a U.S.-based attack. U.S. officials, however, say the attack was inspired ...
In 2002 and 2003, Yukiyasu Tsunoo and colleagues from NEC showed how to attack MISTY and DES symmetric key ciphers, respectively. In 2005, Daniel Bernstein from the University of Illinois, Chicago reported an extraction of an OpenSSL AES key via a cache timing attack, and Colin Percival had a working attack on the OpenSSL RSA key using the Intel processor's cache.