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Those conditions which imagine a purely hypothetical situation (for example, "if I were to die", "if I was dead", "if I had died") usually have the particle ἄν (án) in the apodosis. However, ἄν ( án ) can sometimes be omitted, for example if the apodosis has an imperfect tense verb such as ἔδει ( édei ) "it was necessary" or ...
In his verdict, Munir declared it was necessary to go beyond the constitution to what he claimed was the Common Law, to general legal maxims, and to English historical precedent. He relied on Bracton's maxim, 'that which is otherwise not lawful is made lawful by necessity', and the Roman law maxim urged by Ivor Jennings , 'the well-being of the ...
(a) P is a priori iff P is necessary. (b) P is a posteriori iff P is contingent. Hilary Putnam comments on the significance of Kripke's counter-examples: "Since Kant there has been a big split between philosophers who thought that all necessary truths were analytic and philosophers who thought that some necessary truths were synthetic a priori.
A condition can be both necessary and sufficient. For example, at present, "today is the Fourth of July" is a necessary and sufficient condition for "today is Independence Day in the United States". Similarly, a necessary and sufficient condition for invertibility of a matrix M is that M has a nonzero determinant.
Emergency law/right (nødret, nødrett) is the equivalent of necessity in Denmark and Norway.[1] [2] It is considered related to but separate from self-defence.Common legal examples of necessity includes: breaking windows and other objects in order to escape a fire, commandeering a vehicle to serve as an emergency ambulance, ignoring traffic rules while rushing a dying patient to a hospital ...
For example, speaking of political parties in the Parliament of the United Kingdom, one author wrote: To say of anything that it is a necessary evil (it is often said of examinations, as of parties) is to give away all morality. It is almost a contradiction in terms. That which is necessary can hardly be evil.
Metaphysical necessity is contrasted with other types of necessity. For example, the philosophers of religion John Hick [2] and William L. Rowe [3] distinguished the following three: factual necessity (existential necessity): a factually necessary being is not causally dependent on any other being, while any other being is causally dependent on it.
Genocide justification is the claim that a genocide is morally excusable/defensible, necessary, and/or sanctioned by law. [1] Genocide justification differs from genocide denial , which is an attempt to reject the occurrence of genocide.