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In moral philosophy, instrumental and intrinsic value are the distinction between what is a means to an end and what is as an end in itself. [1] Things are deemed to have instrumental value (or extrinsic value [2]) if they help one achieve a particular end; intrinsic values, by contrast, are understood to be desirable in and of themselves. A ...
Intrinsic value is in contrast to instrumental value (also known as extrinsic value), which is a property of anything that derives its value from a relation to another intrinsically valuable thing. [1] Intrinsic value is always something that an object has "in itself" or "for its own sake", and is an intrinsic property. An object with intrinsic ...
Final goals—also known as terminal goals, absolute values, ends, or telÄ“ —are intrinsically valuable to an intelligent agent, whether an artificial intelligence or a human being, as ends-in-themselves. In contrast, instrumental goals, or instrumental values, are only valuable to an agent as a means toward accomplishing its final goals.
An intrinsically valuable thing is worth for itself, not as a means to something else. It is giving value intrinsic and extrinsic properties. An ethic good with instrumental value may be termed an ethic mean, and an ethic good with intrinsic value may be termed an end-in-itself. An object may be both a mean and end-in-itself.
An "instrumental rationalist" is a decision expert whose response to seeing a man engaged in slicing his toes [the man’s value rational fact-free end] with a blunt knife [the man’s instrumental value-free means] is to rush to advise him that he should use a sharper knife to better serve [instrumentally] his evident [value rational] objective.
An intrinsically valuable thing is worth for itself, not as a means to something else. It is giving value intrinsic and extrinsic properties. An ethic good with instrumental value may be termed an ethic mean, and an ethic good with intrinsic value may be termed an end-in-itself. An object may be both a mean and end-in-itself.
R.H.Lotze, F.Brentano and G.E.Moore have been cited as early proponents of the subject, and to Moore is attributed the important distinction made between intrinsic and instrumental value, that is, between things that have value in themselves and things that might lead to something of value. [4]
An intrinsically valuable thing is worth for itself, not as a means to something else. It is giving value intrinsic and extrinsic properties. An ethic good with instrumental value may be termed an ethic mean, and an ethic good with intrinsic value may be termed an end-in-itself. An object may be both a mean and end-in-itself.