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Polanyi's paradox, named in honour of the British-Hungarian philosopher Michael Polanyi, is the theory that human knowledge of how the world functions and of our own capability are, to a large extent, beyond our explicit understanding.
The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays Presented to Michael Polanyi on his Seventieth Birthday (London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1961). Intellect and Hope: Essays on the Thought of Michael Polanyi, edited by Thomas A. Langford and William H. Poteat (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1968). Poteat is the author of three of the essays included ...
Polanyi gave the Gifford Lectures in 1951–52 at Aberdeen, and a revised version of his lectures were later published as Personal Knowledge (1958). In this book Polanyi claims that all knowledge claims (including those that derive from rules) rely on personal judgments. [13] He denies that a scientific method can yield truth mechanically. All ...
The term tacit knowing is attributed to Michael Polanyi's Personal Knowledge (1958). [2] In his later work, The Tacit Dimension (1966), Polanyi made the assertion that "we can know more than we can tell."
Felski named Michael Polanyi as an important precursor to the project of postcritique. [9] Polanyi had discussed the 'Post-critical'. According to the French philosopher Paul Ricœur, the style of thinking associated with critique began with the work of Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud. [10]
The phrase, "Post-Critical," Poteat drew directly from Michael Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (1958), but Poteat discovered that what Polanyi meant by it was substantially akin to shifts in thinking advocated under other names by other philosophical critics of modern intellectual culture—specifically ...
The history of personal science is derived from several sources, one of which is the 1958 book Personal knowledge: Towards a post-critical philosophy [6] by Michael Polanyi. His work especially highlighted the tacit and subjective dimensions of conventional scientific practices.
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy, 1958; Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, 1961; Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962/1996; Carl Gustav Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, 1965