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The tradition of jury nullification in the United States has its roots in the British legal system, specifically in a 1670 English case where Quakers were acquitted by a jury of violating a law that permitted religious assemblies only under the Church of England. [4]
Some commonly cited historical examples of jury nullification involve jurors refusing to convict persons accused of violating the Fugitive Slave Act by assisting runaway slaves or being fugitive slaves themselves, and refusal of American colonial juries to convict a defendant under English law. [8] Jury nullification is the source of much debate.
Sparf v. United States ended the 100-years old custom of informing the jury of their right to decide both statutory law and facts. Since then, judges do not inform juries of their power to nullify the case statute, although that power is universally acknowledged. Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority, quoted Kane v. Com., 1 Cr. Law Mag. 51, 56:
Jury nullification occurs when a jury returns a not guilty verdict even though jurors believe beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant has broken the law. This may happen when jurors disagree ...
Bushel’s Case (1670) 124 E.R. 1006, also spelled Bushell's Case, is a famous English decision on the role of juries. It established beyond question the independence of the jury. [ 1 ] It also confirmed that the Court of Common Pleas could issue a writ of habeas corpus in ordinary criminal cases.
Chief Justice Jay's instructions to the jury have attracted much interest surrounding their implications for jury nullification. Jay noted it as a "good old rule" that juries should judge questions of fact while deferring to the court on questions of law; yet he observed that the jury could, if it chose, judge both to arrive at a decision. [1]
Make no mistake, jury nullification, like it or not, is as American as apple pie: Courts recognize that jurors surely have the power to nullify, even if not the right.
United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2nd Cir. 1997), [1] was a case in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that a juror could not be removed from a jury on the ground that the juror was acting in purposeful disregard of the court's instructions on the law, when the record evidence raises a possibility that the juror was simply unpersuaded by the Government's case ...