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A Stoic of virtue, by contrast, would amend one's will to suit the world and remain, in the words of Epictetus, "sick and yet happy, in peril and yet happy, dying and yet happy, in exile and happy, in disgrace and happy", [6] thus positing a "completely autonomous" individual will and at the same time a universe that is "a rigidly deterministic ...
The Paradoxa Stoicorum (English: Stoic Paradoxes) is a work by the academic skeptic philosopher Cicero in which he attempts to explain six famous Stoic sayings that appear to go against common understanding: (1) virtue is the sole good; (2) virtue is the sole requisite for happiness; (3) all good deeds are equally virtuous and all bad deeds equally vicious; (4) all fools are mad; (5) only the ...
Suggestions of the Stoic virtues can be found in fragments in the Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus. The Platonist view of the four cardinal virtues is described in Definitions. Practical wisdom or prudence (phrónēsis) is the perspicacity necessary to conduct personal business and affairs of state. It encompasses the skill to distinguish the ...
δικαιοσύνε: justice, "consonant with the law and instrumental to a sense of duty" (Diogenes Laertius 7.98). One of the four virtues (justice, courage, temperance, wisdom/prudence). dogma δόγμα: principle established by reason and experience. doxa δόξα: belief, opinion.
Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium (Latin for "Moral Letters to Lucilius"), also known as the Moral Epistles and Letters from a Stoic, is a letter collection of 124 letters that Seneca the Younger wrote at the end of his life, during his retirement, after he had worked for the Emperor Nero for more than ten years.
For the Stoic, Zeno of Citium, sophrosyne is one of the four chief virtues. [13] Later Stoics like Musonius Rufus, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius took a practical view of sophrosyne and share a definition of it as the restraint of the appetites. [4]: 228–29 Demophilus, a Pythagorean philosopher of uncertain date, wrote: [14]
Some modern versions of virtue ethics do not define virtues in terms of well being or flourishing, and some go so far as to define virtues as traits that tend to promote some other good that is defined independently of the virtues, thereby subsuming virtue ethics under (or somehow merging it with) consequentialist ethics.
Virtue is entirely sufficient for a happy life under all possible circumstances: in poverty, in exile, in blindness, in deafness, even under torture. [15] Happiness and misery depend on character and are independent of circumstances, and Virtue is the source of all in this earthly life that is worth living for.