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One example of deniable encryption is a cryptographic filesystem that employs a concept of abstract "layers", where each layer can be decrypted with a different encryption key. [ citation needed ] Additionally, special " chaff layers" are filled with random data in order to have plausible deniability of the existence of real layers and their ...
The construct of the *Inner Envelope* behind the Human Proxy function also creates new cryptographic challenges, provides plausible deniability to included nodes, and offers new perspectives in encryption, its analysis and decryption: As all messages in the network are encrypted, end-to-end encryption is new defined and gets with Human Proxies ...
As another example, some kinds of steganography attempt to hide data by making it match the statistical characteristics of the innocent "random" image noise in digital photos. To support such deniable encryption systems, a few cryptographic algorithms are specifically designed to make ciphertext messages indistinguishable from random bit strings.
The term "probabilistic encryption" is typically used in reference to public key encryption algorithms; however various symmetric key encryption algorithms achieve a similar property (e.g., block ciphers when used in a chaining mode such as CBC), and stream ciphers such as Freestyle [1] which are inherently random.
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is the IETF's standard for cryptographically protected messages. It can be used by cryptographic schemes and protocols to digitally sign, digest, authenticate or encrypt any form of digital data.
The adversary receives the encryption of m b, and attempts to "guess" which plaintext it received, and outputs a bit b'. A cipher has indistinguishable encryptions under a chosen-plaintext attack if after running the above experiment the adversary can't guess correctly (b=b') with probability non-negligibly better than 1/2. [3]
In practice, deniable authentication between two parties can be achieved through the use of message authentication codes (MACs) by making sure that if an attacker is able to decrypt the messages, they would also know the MAC key as part of the protocol, and would thus be able to forge authentic-looking messages. [4]
In 2001, Barak et al., showing that black-box obfuscation is impossible, also proposed the idea of an indistinguishability obfuscator, and constructed an inefficient one. [8] [7] [2] Although this notion seemed relatively weak, Goldwasser and Rothblum (2007) showed that an efficient indistinguishability obfuscator would be a best-possible obfuscator, and any best-possible obfuscator would be ...