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Auction theory is a branch of applied economics that deals with how bidders act in auctions and researches how the features of ... Krishna, Vijay (2002). Auction theory.
Vijay Krishna (born 7 February 1956 in Delhi, India) is an Indian American economist who is a Distinguished Professor of Economics and Job Market Placement Director of the Department of Economics at the Pennsylvania State University.
Vijay Krishna, Auction Theory, Academic Press, 2002. Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg (Eds), Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006, Chapter 1. ISBN 0-262-03342-9. Paul Milgrom, Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press, 2004. Teck Ho, "Consumption and Production" UC Berkeley, Haas Class of 2010.
At the 2008 Nemmers Prize conference, Penn State University economist Vijay Krishna [6] and Larry Ausubel [7] highlighted Milgrom's contributions to auction theory and their subsequent impact on auction design.
The linkage principle is a finding of auction theory. It states that auction houses have an incentive to pre-commit to revealing all available information about each lot, positive or negative. The linkage principle is seen in the art market with the tradition of auctioneers hiring art experts to examine each lot and pre-commit to provide a ...
The branch of economic theory dealing with auction types and participants' behavior in auctions is called auction theory. The open ascending price auction is arguably the most common form of auction and has been used throughout history. [1] Participants bid openly against one another, with each subsequent bid being higher than the previous bid. [2]
A VCG mechanism can also be used in a double auction. It is the most general form of incentive-compatible double-auction since it can handle a combinatorial auction with arbitrary value functions on bundles. Unfortunately, it is not budget-balanced: the total value paid by the buyers is smaller than the total value received by the sellers.
Revenue equivalence is a concept in auction theory that states that given certain conditions, any mechanism that results in the same outcomes (i.e. allocates items to the same bidders) also has the same expected revenue.