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A social choice function, sometimes called a voting system in the context of politics, is a rule that takes an individual's complete and transitive preferences over a set of outcomes and returns a single chosen outcome (or a set of tied outcomes). We can think of this subset as the winners of an election, and compare different social choice ...
Less informally, the social choice function is the function mapping each environment S of available social states (at least two) for any given set of orderings (and corresponding social ordering R) to the social choice set, the set of social states each element of which is top-ranked (by R) for that environment and that set of orderings.
A social scoring function maps each candidate to a number representing their quality. For example, the standard social scoring function for first-preference plurality is the total number of voters who rank a candidate first. Every social ordering can be made into a choice function by considering only the highest-ranked outcome.
In social choice theory, unrestricted domain, or universality, is a property of social welfare functions in which all preferences of all voters (but no other considerations) are allowed. Intuitively, unrestricted domain is a common requirement for social choice functions, and is a condition for Arrow's impossibility theorem.
Arrow's theorem assumes as background that any non-degenerate social choice rule will satisfy: [15]. Unrestricted domain – the social choice function is a total function over the domain of all possible orderings of outcomes, not just a partial function.
A social-choice-function is a function that maps a set of individual preferences to an optimal social outcome. An example function is the utilitarian rule, which says "give the item to a person that values it the most". We denote a social choice function by Soc and its recommended outcome given a set of preferences by Soc(Prefs). A mechanism is ...
When agents have general preferences represented by cardinal utility functions, the utilitarian social-choice function (selecting the outcome that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations) is not strongly-monotonic but it is weakly monotonic. Indeed, it can be implemented by the VCG mechanism, which is a truthful mechanism with money.
The social penetration theory (SPT) proposes that as relationships develop, interpersonal communication moves from relatively shallow, non-intimate levels to deeper, more intimate ones. [1] The theory was formulated by psychologists Irwin Altman of the University of Utah [ 2 ] and Dalmas Taylor of the University of Delaware [ 3 ] in 1973 to ...