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Napoleon and Francis I after the Battle of Austerlitz. Napoleon did not succeed in defeating the Allied army as thoroughly as he wanted, [3] but historians and enthusiasts alike recognize that the original plan provided a significant victory, comparable to other great tactical battles such as Cannae. [94]
Infantry formed the base of Napoleonic tactics as they were the largest force in all of the major battles of eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. Many Napoleonic tactics were developed by ancien régime royalist strategists like Jean-Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval; Jean-Pierre du Teil; Jacques Antoine Hippolyte; and Pierre-Joseph Bourcet. [2]
The strategy of the central position (French: stratégie de la position centrale) [1] was a key tactical doctrine followed by Napoleon in the Napoleonic Wars. [2] It involved attacking two cooperating armies at their hinge, swinging around to fight one until it fled, then turning to face the other. The strategy allowed the use of a smaller ...
[136] [page range too broad] Napoleon vowed that he would create a new army as large as the one he had sent into Russia, and quickly built up his forces in the east from 30,000 to 130,000 and eventually to 400,000. Napoleon inflicted 40,000 casualties on the Allies at Lützen (2 May 1813) and Bautzen (20–21 May 1813). Both battles involved ...
Haythornthwaite, Philip J. Napoleon's Military Machine (1995) excerpt and text search; Lynn, John A. The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791–94, (1984) 356 pages, ISBN 0-8133-2945-0; Rothenberg, Gunther E. (1980). The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon.
The Campaigns of Napoleon (1973) 1172 pp; a detailed guide to all major battles excerpt and text search; Crowdy, Terry. Napoleon's Infantry Handbook (2015) Dupuy, Trevor N. and Dupuy, R. Ernest. The Encyclopedia of Military History (2nd edition 1970) pp 730–770; Elting, John R. Swords Around a Throne: Napoleon's Grand Armee (1988) Esdaile ...
The tactics, as was the case for every other royalist army, were based on the concept of linear deployment which, if at the beginning gave good results against the undisciplined French troops, from 1796 had to give way against the genius of Napoleon.
In July 1806, Napoleon created the Confederation of the Rhine, a string of German client states which on becoming allies of France pledged themselves to raise an army of 63,000 men. With Napoleon as their "Protector", the confederate states were compelled to leave the Holy Roman Empire, which was dissolved shortly afterward. [68]