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The prevalence of malware infection by means of USB flash drive was documented in a 2011 Microsoft study [6] analyzing data from more than 600 million systems worldwide in the first half of 2011. The study found that 26 percent of all malware infections of Windows system were due to USB flash drives exploiting the AutoRun feature in Microsoft ...
Disk encryption usually includes all aspects of the disk, including directories, so that an adversary cannot determine content, name or size of any file. It is well suited to portable devices such as laptop computers and thumb drives which are particularly susceptible to being lost or stolen. If used properly, someone finding a lost device ...
BadUSB is a computer security attack using USB devices that are programmed with malicious software. [2] For example, USB flash drives can contain a programmable Intel 8051 microcontroller, which can be reprogrammed, turning a USB flash drive into a malicious device. [3] This attack works by programming the fake USB flash drive to emulate a ...
In 2008, Hard Disk Sentinel DOS version was released in different formats on bootable pen drive, CD, floppy. Usable when no operating system installed (or if the system is not bootable otherwise) to detect and display temperature, health status of IDE, SATA hard disk drives and with limited AHCI controller support.
As a result, a boot disk, live CD, live USB, or any other type of live distro contains a minimal operating system. BartPE: a lightweight variant of Microsoft Windows XP or Windows Server 2003 32-bit operating systems, similar to a Windows Preinstallation Environment, which can be run from a live CD or live USB drive. Discontinued.
While in beta, Disk Drill for Windows is licensed as freeware and allows to recover the deleted files from storage devices that can be accessed from Windows PC. Disk Drill for Windows also includes the Recovery Vault technology and works on any Windows XP system or newer (Windows Vista, 7, 8, 10).
There are potential weaknesses in the implementation of the protocol between the dongle and the copy-controlled software. For example, a simple implementation might define a function to check for the dongle's presence, returning "true" or "false" accordingly, but the dongle requirement can be easily circumvented by modifying the software to always answer "true".
Even a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is not effective against the attack, as the operating system needs to hold the decryption keys in memory in order to access the disk. [7] Full disk encryption is also vulnerable when a computer is stolen when suspended. As wake-up does not involve a BIOS boot sequence, it typically does not ask for the FDE ...