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Quoting out of context (sometimes referred to as contextomy or quote mining) is an informal fallacy in which a passage is removed from its surrounding matter in such a way as to distort its intended meaning. [1] Context may be omitted intentionally or accidentally, thinking it to be non-essential.
ἀδιάφορα: indifferent things, neither good nor bad. agathos ἀγαθός: good, proper object of desire. anthrôpos ἄνθρωπος: human being, used by Epictetus to express an ethical ideal. apatheia ἀπάθεια: serenity, peace of mind, such as that achieved by the Stoic sage. aphormê
Regarding procreation, the argument follows that coming into existence generates both good and bad experiences, pain and pleasure, whereas not coming into existence entails neither pain nor pleasure. The absence of pain is good, the absence of pleasure is not bad. Therefore, the ethical choice is weighed in favor of non-procreation.
Neutrality is distinct (though not exclusive) from apathy, ignorance, indifference, doublethink, equality, [6] agreement, and objectivity. Apathy and indifference each imply a level of carelessness about a subject, though a person exhibiting neutrality may feel bias on a subject but choose not to act on it.
The unexamined life is not worth living" is a famous dictum supposedly uttered by Socrates at his trial for impiety and corrupting youth, for which he was subsequently sentenced to death. The dictum is recorded in Plato's Apology (38a5–6) as ho dè anexétastos bíos ou biōtòs anthrṓpōi (but the unexamined life is not lived by man) ( ὁ ...
The use of this Greek word was first introduced into philosophy by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. [2] To Epictetus, it is the faculty that distinguishes human beings from all other creatures. The concept of prohairesis plays a cardinal role in the Discourses and in the Manual : the terms "prohairesis", "prohairetic", and "aprohairetic ...
The term naturalistic fallacy is sometimes used to label the problematic inference of an ought from an is (the is–ought problem). [3] Michael Ridge relevantly elaborates that "[t]he intuitive idea is that evaluative conclusions require at least one evaluative premise—purely factual premises about the naturalistic features of things do not entail or even support evaluative conclusions."
Euthyphro proposes (6e) that the pious (τὸ ὅσιον) is the same thing as that which is loved by the gods (τὸ θεοφιλές), but Socrates finds a problem with this proposal: the gods may disagree among themselves (7e). Euthyphro then revises his definition, so that piety is only that which is loved by all of the gods unanimously (9e).