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After NIST's announcement regarding the finalists and the alternate candidates, various intellectual property concerns were voiced, notably surrounding lattice-based schemes such as Kyber and NewHope. NIST holds signed statements from submitting groups clearing any legal claims, but there is still a concern that third parties could raise claims.
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC), sometimes referred to as quantum-proof, quantum-safe, or quantum-resistant, is the development of cryptographic algorithms (usually public-key algorithms) that are currently thought to be secure against a cryptanalytic attack by a quantum computer.
The FIPS 140 standard established the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) as a joint effort by the NIST and the Communications Security Establishment (CSEC) for the Canadian government, now handled by the CCCS, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, a new centralized initiative within the CSEC agency.
Kyber is a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) designed to be resistant to cryptanalytic attacks with future powerful quantum computers.It is used to establish a shared secret between two communicating parties without an attacker in the transmission system being able to decrypt it.
NIST replaced these codes with the more permanent GNIS Feature ID, maintained by the U.S. Board on Geographic Names. The GNIS database is the official geographic names repository database for the United States, and is designated the only source of geographic names and locative attributes for use by the agencies of the Federal Government. [ 11 ]
Dilithium was selected for standardization by the NIST. [1] According to a message from Ray Perlner, writing on behalf of the NIST PQC team, the NIST module-LWE signing standard is to be based on version 3.1 of the Dilithium specification. Falcon, which is built upon short integer solution (SIS) over NTRU. Falcon was selected for ...
This, and the overall delivery and timing of the announcement, in the absence of post-quantum standards, raised considerable speculation about whether NSA had found weaknesses e.g. in elliptic-curve algorithms or others, or was trying to distance itself from an exclusive focus on ECC for non-technical reasons. [7] [8] [9]
A presentation once anticipated that BLISS would become a potential candidate for standardization, however it was not submitted to NIST. NIST's criteria for selecting schemes to standardize includes side-channel resistance. However, BLISS and derivative schemes like GALACTICS have shown vulnerabilities to a number of side-channel and timing ...