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OpenSSL is a software library for applications that provide secure ... [51] [52] [53] and further support from Oracle in ... "OpenSSL programming tutorial". August 16 ...
An attack called POODLE [19] (late 2014) combines both a downgrade attack (to SSL 3.0) with a padding oracle attack on the older, insecure protocol to enable compromise of the transmitted data. In May 2016 it has been revealed in CVE-2016-2107 that the fix against Lucky Thirteen in OpenSSL introduced another timing-based padding oracle. [20] [21]
OpenSSL was available at the time, and was dual licensed under the OpenSSL License and the SSLeay license. [7] yaSSL, alternatively, was developed and dual-licensed under both a commercial license and the GPL. [8] yaSSL offered a more modern API, commercial style developer support and was complete with an OpenSSL compatibility layer. [4]
Several versions of the TLS protocol exist. SSL 2.0 is a deprecated [27] protocol version with significant weaknesses. SSL 3.0 (1996) and TLS 1.0 (1999) are successors with two weaknesses in CBC-padding that were explained in 2001 by Serge Vaudenay. [28]
where A S(k, · ) denotes that A has access to the oracle S(k, · ), and Query(A S(k, · ), 1 n) denotes the set of the queries on S made by A, which knows n. Clearly we require that any adversary cannot directly query the string x on S , since otherwise a valid tag can be easily obtained by that adversary.
The PKCS #11 standard defines a platform-independent API to cryptographic tokens, such as hardware security modules (HSM) and smart cards, and names the API itself "Cryptoki" (from "cryptographic token interface" and pronounced as "crypto-key", although "PKCS #11" is often used to refer to the API as well as the standard that defines it).
A Lucky Thirteen attack is a cryptographic timing attack against implementations of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol that use the CBC mode of operation, first reported in February 2013 by its developers Nadhem J. AlFardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London.
However, the original scheme was proved in the random oracle model to be IND-CCA2 secure when OAEP is used with the RSA permutation using standard encryption exponents, as in the case of RSA-OAEP. [2] An improved scheme (called OAEP+) that works with any trapdoor one-way permutation was offered by Victor Shoup to solve this problem. [3]