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DO-178B, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification is a guideline dealing with the safety of safety-critical software used in certain airborne systems. It was jointly developed by the safety-critical working group RTCA SC-167 of the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) and WG-12 of the European ...
Download as PDF; Printable version; In other projects ... boundaries between the key DO-178B concepts of high-level requirements, low-level requirements, and derived ...
CAST-15, Merging High-Level and Low-Level Requirements is a Certification Authorities Software Team (CAST) Position Paper. It is an FAA publication that "does not constitute official policy or guidance from any of the authorities", but is provided to applicants for software and hardware certification for educational and informational purposes only.
INTEGRITY-178B is the DO-178B–compliant version of INTEGRITY. It is used in several military jets such as the B-2, [2] F-16, F-22, and F-35, and the commercial aircraft Airbus A380. [3] Its kernel design guarantees bounded computing times by eliminating features such as dynamic memory allocation.
The earliest revisions of the Advisory Circular were brief, serving little more than to call attention to active DO-178 revisions. The Advisory Circular revisions C and D are considerably longer, giving guidance in modifying and re-using software previously approved using DO-178, DO-178A, or DO-178B (preceding revisions of the DO-178 standard).
MC/DC is used in avionics software development guidance DO-178B and DO-178C to ensure adequate testing of the most critical (Level A) software, which is defined as that software which could provide (or prevent failure of) continued safe flight and landing of an aircraft.
The Certification Authorities Software Team (CAST) is an international group of aviation certification and regulatory authority representatives. The organization of has been a means of coordination among representatives from certification authorities in North and South America, Europe, and Asia, in particular, the FAA and EASA.
The PSSA and CCA generate separation requirements to identify and eliminate common mode failures. Subsystem failure rate budgets are assigned so that hazard probability limits can be met. The CCA consists of three separate types of analyses which are designed to uncover hazards not created by a specific subsystem component failure.