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Since an OCSP response has less data to parse, the client-side libraries that handle it can be less complex than those that handle CRLs. [11] OCSP discloses to the responder that a particular network host used a particular certificate at a particular time. OCSP does not mandate encryption, so other parties may intercept this information. [2]
A CRL is generated and published periodically, often at a defined interval. A CRL can also be published immediately after a certificate has been revoked. A CRL is issued by a CRL issuer, which is typically the CA which also issued the corresponding certificates, but could alternatively be some other trusted authority.
OCSP stapling can solve the operational challenges of OCSP, namely additional network requests causing latency and privacy degradation. [33] However, it can be susceptible to downgrade attacks by an on-path attacker. [9] RFC 7633 defines an extension that embeds a requirement into a certificate to be stapled to a valid OCSP response. [34]
The revocation status is checked, whether by CRL, OCSP, or some other mechanism, to ensure the certificate is not revoked; The issuer name is checked to ensure that it equals the subject name of the previous certificate in the path;
OCSP stapling is designed to reduce the cost of an OCSP validation, both for the client and the OCSP responder, especially for large sites serving many simultaneous users. However, OCSP stapling supports only one OCSP response at a time, which is insufficient for certificate chains with intermediate CA certs. [26] [27]
It must be continuously updated with current CRL information from a certificate authority which issued the certificates contained within the CRL. While this is a potentially labor-intensive process, the use of a dedicated validation authority allows for dynamic validation of certificates issued by an offline root certificate authority .
A drawback to offline operation is that hosting of a certificate revocation list by the root CA is not possible (as it is unable to respond to CRL requests via protocols such as HTTP, LDAP or OCSP). However, it is possible to move certificate validation functionality into a dedicated validation authority authorized by the offline root CA.
Their use doesn't involve the problems of trusting third parties that may improperly sign certificates. Self-signed certificate transactions usually present a far smaller attack surface by eliminating both the complex certificate chain validation, [1] and certificate revocation checks like CRL and OCSP.