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Antinaturalism is a view in sociology and other disciplines which states that nature and society are different. The ideas first developed in the field of history in the works of Wilhelm Dilthey and Heinrich Rickert, and it was applied to sociology by Max Weber.
A similar form of naturalism was applied to the scientific study of art and literature by Hippolyte Taine. Contemporary sociologists do not generally dispute that social phenomena take place within the natural universe, and thus are subject to natural constraints, such as the laws of physics. What is for debate is the nature of the ...
Methodological naturalism, the second sense of the term "naturalism", (see above) is "the adoption or assumption of philosophical naturalism … with or without fully accepting or believing it.” [25] Robert T. Pennock used the term to clarify that the scientific method confines itself to natural explanations without assuming the existence or ...
3. Therefore, if naturalism is true, then no belief is rationally inferred (from 1 and 2). 4. We have good reason to accept naturalism only if it can be rationally inferred from good evidence. 5. Therefore, there is not, and cannot be, good reason to accept naturalism. [1] In short, naturalism undercuts itself.
In social science, antipositivism (also interpretivism, negativism [citation needed] or antinaturalism) is a theoretical stance which proposes that the social realm cannot be studied with the methods of investigation utilized within the natural sciences, and that investigation of the social realm requires a different epistemology.
The evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN) is a philosophical argument asserting a problem with believing both evolution and philosophical naturalism simultaneously. The argument was first proposed by Alvin Plantinga in 1993 and "raises issues of interest to epistemologists , philosophers of mind, evolutionary biologists, and ...
The term naturalistic fallacy is sometimes used to label the problematic inference of an ought from an is (the is–ought problem). [3] Michael Ridge relevantly elaborates that "[t]he intuitive idea is that evaluative conclusions require at least one evaluative premise—purely factual premises about the naturalistic features of things do not entail or even support evaluative conclusions."
The history of the debate from a critic's perspective is detailed by Gannon (2002). [10] Critics of evolutionary psychology include the philosophers of science David Buller (author of Adapting Minds), [11] Robert C. Richardson (author of Evolutionary Psychology as Maladapted Psychology), [12] and Brendan Wallace (author of Getting Darwin Wrong: Why Evolutionary Psychology Won't Work).