Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
Antinaturalism is a view in sociology and other disciplines which states that nature and society are different. The ideas first developed in the field of history in the works of Wilhelm Dilthey and Heinrich Rickert, and it was applied to sociology by Max Weber.
Sociological naturalism is a theory that states that natural and society are roughly identical and governed by similar principles. In sociological texts, it is simply referred to as naturalism and can be traced back to the philosophical thinking of Auguste Comte in the 19th century.
In social science, antipositivism (also interpretivism, negativism [citation needed] or antinaturalism) is a theoretical stance which proposes that the social realm cannot be studied with the methods of investigation utilized within the natural sciences, and that investigation of the social realm requires a different epistemology.
4. We have good reason to accept naturalism only if it can be rationally inferred from good evidence. 5. Therefore, there is not, and cannot be, good reason to accept naturalism. [1] In short, naturalism undercuts itself. If naturalism is true, then we cannot sensibly believe it or virtually anything else.
The evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN) is a philosophical argument asserting a problem with believing both evolution and philosophical naturalism simultaneously. The argument was first proposed by Alvin Plantinga in 1993 and "raises issues of interest to epistemologists , philosophers of mind, evolutionary biologists, and ...
John Rogers Searle (American English pronunciation: / s ɜːr l /; born July 31, 1932) [4] is an American philosopher widely noted for contributions to the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and social philosophy.
Critical naturalism is the term that Bhaskar used to describe the argument that he develops in his second book The Possibility of Naturalism (1979). [32] He defines naturalism as the view that "social objects can be studied in essentially the same way as natural ones, that is, 'scientifically'". [33]
The term naturalistic fallacy is sometimes used to label the problematic inference of an ought from an is (the is–ought problem). [3] Michael Ridge relevantly elaborates that "[t]he intuitive idea is that evaluative conclusions require at least one evaluative premise—purely factual premises about the naturalistic features of things do not entail or even support evaluative conclusions."