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Levine thinks such thought experiments demonstrate an explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical world: even if consciousness is reducible to physical things, consciousness cannot be explained in terms of physical things, because the link between physical things and consciousness is a contingent link. [43]
Epiphenomenalism is a position in the philosophy of mind on the mind–body problem.It holds that subjective mental events are completely dependent for their existence on corresponding physical and biochemical events within the human body, but do not themselves influence physical events.
Changes at the macro-level (the whole brain) constitute consciousness. Micro-changes cause and then are impacted by holistic changes, in much the same way that individual football players cause a team (as a whole) to win games, causing the individuals to gain confidence from the knowledge that they are part of a winning team.
The Wellesley study is significant because the physical source of consciousness has been a mystery for decades. It’s a major step toward verifying a theory that our brains perform quantum ...
Psychophysical parallelism can be compared to epiphenomenalism due to the fact that they are both non-fundamentalist methods to link mind and body causality. Psychophysical parallelism is the ideology that the mind and the body hold no interaction between them, but that they are synchronized.
In other words, according to Block, humans were conscious all along but did not have the concept of consciousness and thus did not discuss it in their texts. Daniel Dennett countered that for some things, such as money, baseball, or consciousness, one cannot have the thing without also having the concept of the thing. [31] [32] [33]
The most commonly given answer is that we attribute consciousness to other people because we see that they resemble us in appearance and behavior; we reason that if they look like us and act like us, they must be like us in other ways, including having experiences of the sort that we do. [70]
Of these design changes, he suggests that "at least in principle, I see no reason why they would not lead to an artificial consciousness" (p. 261). Dehaene suggests that the hard problem of consciousness "just seems hard because it engages ill-defined intuitions", and it "will evaporate" as people better understand "cognitive neuroscience and ...