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EJBCA (formerly: Enterprise JavaBeans Certificate Authority) is a free software public key infrastructure (PKI) certificate authority software package maintained and sponsored by the Swedish for-profit company PrimeKey Solutions AB, which holds the copyright to most of the codebase, being a subsidiary for Keyfactor Inc. based in United States.
If any check fails on any certificate, the algorithm terminates and path validation fails. (This is an explanatory summary of the scope of the algorithm, not a rigorous reproduction of the detailed steps.) The public key algorithm and parameters are checked; The current date/time is checked against the validity period of the certificate;
The developer can either generate this key on their own or obtain one from a trusted certificate authority (CA). [5] Code signing is particularly valuable in distributed environments, where the source of a given piece of code may not be immediately evident - for example Java applets, ActiveX controls and other active web and browser scripting code.
This reversible status can be used to note the temporary invalidity of the certificate (e.g., if the user is unsure if the private key has been lost). If, in this example, the private key was found and nobody had access to it, the status could be reinstated, and the certificate is valid again, thus removing the certificate from future CRLs.
Java Authentication and Authorization Service, or JAAS, pronounced "Jazz", [1] is the Java implementation of the standard Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) information security framework. [2] JAAS was introduced as an extension library to the Java Platform, Standard Edition 1.3 and was integrated in version 1.4.
When the certificate is presented for an entity to validate, they first verify the hash of the certificate matches the reference hash in the white-list, and if they match (indicating the self-signed certificate is the same as the one that was formerly trusted) then the certificate's validity dates can be trusted.
CRVs are expected to be small enough to enable push-based checking, but more constrained clients may still perform pull-based checks, only accessing select CRVs, or deferring retrieval of CRVs until certificate validation. [43] A client using Let's Revoke with push-based checking is able to fail-hard for any certificate with a revocation number ...
The OCSP responder uses the certificate serial number to look up the revocation status of Alice's certificate. The OCSP responder looks in a CA database that Carol maintains. In this scenario, Carol's CA database is the only trusted location where a compromise to Alice's certificate would be recorded.