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The main difficulty in designing an envy-free procedure for n > 2 agents is that the problem is not "divisible".I.e., if we divide half of the cake among n/2 agents in an envy-free manner, we cannot just let the other n/2 agents divide the other half in the same manner, because this might cause the first group of n/2 agents to be envious (e.g., it is possible that A and B both believe they got ...
Average-proportional cake-cutting (i.e., an allocation between n families, such that for each family, the average value is at least 1/n of the total) cannot be computed using finitely-many RW queries, even when there are 2 families with 2 members in each family. The proof is by reduction from equitable cake-cutting.
Divide and choose (also Cut and choose or I cut, you choose) is a procedure for fair division of a continuous resource, such as a cake, between two parties. It involves a heterogeneous good or resource ("the cake") and two partners who have different preferences over parts of the cake (both want as much of it as possible). The procedure ...
A microwave oven or simply microwave is an electric oven that heats and cooks food by exposing it to electromagnetic radiation in the microwave frequency range. [1] This induces polar molecules in the food to rotate and produce thermal energy (heat) in a process known as dielectric heating .
The classic divide and choose procedure for cake-cutting is not truthful: if the cutter knows the chooser's preferences, they can get much more than 1/2 by acting strategically. For example, suppose the cutter values a piece by its size while the chooser values a piece by the amount of chocolate in it.
Symmetric fair cake-cutting is a variant of the fair cake-cutting problem, in which fairness is applied not only to the final outcome, but also to the assignment of roles in the division procedure. As an example, consider a birthday cake that has to be divided between two children with different tastes, such that each child feels that his/her ...
When any player shouts "cut", the cake is cut by the sword and by whichever of the players' knives happens to be the central one of the three (that is, the second in order from the sword). Then the cake is divided in the following way: The piece to the left of the sword, which we denote Left, is given to the player who first shouted "cut". We ...
There is a generalization of the cake-cutting problem in which there are several cakes, and each agent needs to get a piece in each cake. Cloutier, Nyman and Su [17] study two-player envy-free multi-cake division. For two cakes, they prove that an EF allocation may not exist when there are 2 agents and each cake is cut into 2 pieces.