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An attack called POODLE [19] (late 2014) combines both a downgrade attack (to SSL 3.0) with a padding oracle attack on the older, insecure protocol to enable compromise of the transmitted data. In May 2016 it has been revealed in CVE-2016-2107 that the fix against Lucky Thirteen in OpenSSL introduced another timing-based padding oracle. [20] [21]
The attacker can then combine the oracle with a systematic search of the problem space to complete their attack. [1] The padding oracle attack, and compression oracle attacks such as BREACH, are examples of oracle attacks, as was the practice of "crib-dragging" in the cryptanalysis of the Enigma machine. An oracle need not be 100% accurate ...
Multiple attacks were discovered against PKCS #1 v1.5, specifically its padding scheme. [3] [4] In 1998, Daniel Bleichenbacher published a seminal paper on what became known as Bleichenbacher's attack (also known as "million message attack"). The attack uses the padding as an oracle. [4] [5] PKCS #1 was subsequently updated in the release 2.0 ...
In cryptography, Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) is a padding scheme often used together with RSA encryption. OAEP was introduced by Bellare and Rogaway , [ 1 ] and subsequently standardized in PKCS#1 v2 and RFC 2437.
Adaptive-chosen-ciphertext attacks were perhaps considered to be a theoretical concern, but not to have been be manifested in practice, until 1998, when Daniel Bleichenbacher (then of Bell Laboratories) demonstrated a practical attack against systems using RSA encryption in concert with the PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding function, including a version of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol used by ...
The following attack on a one-time pad allows full recovery of the secret key. Suppose the message length and key length are equal to n. The adversary sends a string consisting of n zeroes to the oracle. The oracle returns the bitwise exclusive-or of the key with the string of zeroes. The string returned by the oracle is the secret key.
The term "lunchtime attack" refers to the idea that a user's computer, with the ability to decrypt, is available to an attacker while the user is out to lunch. This form of the attack was the first one commonly discussed: obviously, if the attacker has the ability to make adaptive chosen ciphertext queries, no encrypted message would be safe ...
A Lucky Thirteen attack is a cryptographic timing attack against implementations of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol that use the CBC mode of operation, first reported in February 2013 by its developers Nadhem J. AlFardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London. [1] [2]