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In philosophy and modal logic, epistemic possibility relates a statement under consideration to the current state of our knowledge about the actual world: a statement is said to be: epistemically possible if it may be true, for all we know; epistemically necessary if it is certain (or must be the case), given what we know
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that examines the nature, origin, and limits of knowledge. Also called theory of knowledge , it explores different types of knowledge, such as propositional knowledge about facts, practical knowledge in the form of skills, and knowledge by acquaintance as a familiarity through experience.
Modal logic is a kind of logic used to represent statements about necessity and possibility.It plays a major role in philosophy and related fields as a tool for understanding concepts such as knowledge, obligation, and causation.
Philosophical skepticism (UK spelling: scepticism; from Greek σκέψις skepsis, "inquiry") is a family of philosophical views that question the possibility of knowledge. [1] [2] It differs from other forms of skepticism in that it even rejects very plausible knowledge claims that belong to basic common sense.
Epistemic modal logic is a subfield of modal logic that is concerned with reasoning about knowledge.While epistemology has a long philosophical tradition dating back to Ancient Greece, epistemic logic is a much more recent development with applications in many fields, including philosophy, theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, economics, and linguistics.
Justification (also called epistemic justification) is a property of beliefs that fulfill certain norms about what a person should believe. [1] [2] Epistemologists often identify justification as a component of knowledge distinguishing it from mere true opinion. [3]
With three weeks left in the 2024 NFL regular season, it seems likely that at least a few records will be broken. Keep an eye on these marks.
Under multimodal logic, e.g., "X is possibly (in epistemic modality, per one's data) necessary (in alethic modality)," it no longer follows that X being necessary in at least one epistemically possible world means it is necessary in all epistemically possible worlds. This aligns with the intuition that proposing a certain necessary entity does ...