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Because of this example, some authors credit Condorcet with having given an intuitive argument that presents the core of Arrow's theorem. [20] However, Arrow's theorem is substantially more general; it applies to methods of making decisions other than one-man-one-vote elections, such as markets or weighted voting, based on ranked ballots.
The work culminated in what Arrow called the "General Possibility Theorem," better known thereafter as Arrow's (impossibility) theorem. The theorem states that, absent restrictions on either individual preferences or neutrality of the constitution to feasible alternatives, there exists no social choice rule that satisfies a set of plausible ...
Kenneth Joseph Arrow (August 23, 1921 – February 21, 2017) was an American economist, mathematician and political theorist.He received the John Bates Clark Medal in 1957, and the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1972, along with John Hicks.
Arrow's impossibility theorem is a key result on social welfare functions, showing an important difference between social and consumer choice: whereas it is possible to construct a rational (non-self-contradictory) decision procedure for consumers based only on ordinal preferences, it is impossible to do the same in the social choice setting ...
Kenneth Arrow's book Social Choice and Individual Values is often recognized as inaugurating the modern era of social choice theory. [4] Later work has also considered approaches to legal compensation , fair division , variable populations , [ citation needed ] partial strategy-proofing of social-choice mechanisms , [ 9 ] natural resources ...
Unrestricted domain is one of the conditions for Arrow's impossibility theorem. Under that theorem, it is impossible to have a social choice function that satisfies unrestricted domain, Pareto efficiency, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship. However, the conditions of the theorem can be satisfied if unrestricted domain ...
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Arrow's impossibility theorem shows that no reasonable (non-random, non-dictatorial) ranked voting system can satisfy IIA. However, Arrow's theorem does not apply to rated voting methods. These can pass IIA under certain assumptions, but fail it if they are not met. Methods that unconditionally pass IIA include sortition and random dictatorship.