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Cryptographically Secure Random number on Windows without using CryptoAPI; Conjectured Security of the ANSI-NIST Elliptic Curve RNG, Daniel R. L. Brown, IACR ePrint 2006/117. A Security Analysis of the NIST SP 800-90 Elliptic Curve Random Number Generator, Daniel R. L. Brown and Kristian Gjosteen, IACR ePrint 2007/048. To appear in CRYPTO 2007.
Dual_EC_DRBG (Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator) [1] is an algorithm that was presented as a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG) using methods in elliptic curve cryptography.
Strong random number generation is important throughout every phase of public-key cryptography. For instance, if a weak generator is used for the symmetric keys that are being distributed by RSA, then an eavesdropper could bypass RSA and guess the symmetric keys directly.
Subverted random numbers can be created using a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator with a seed value known to the attacker but concealed in the software. A relatively short, say 24 to 40 bit, portion of the seed can be truly random to prevent tell-tale repetitions, but not long enough to prevent the attacker from recovering ...
These approaches combine a pseudo-random number generator (often in the form of a block or stream cipher) with an external source of randomness (e.g., mouse movements, delay between keyboard presses etc.). /dev/random – Unix-like systems; CryptGenRandom – Microsoft Windows; Fortuna
From 2004 to 2013 the default random number generator in the library was a NIST-approved RNG standard, widely known to be insecure from at least 2006, containing a kleptographic backdoor from the American National Security Agency (NSA), as part of its secret Bullrun program. [3]
A PRNG is a computer algorithm that produces data that appears random under analysis. PRNGs that use system entropy to seed data generally produce better results, since this makes the initial conditions of the PRNG much more difficult for an attacker to guess. Another way to generate randomness is to utilize information outside the system.
[36] [48] RSA Security officials have largely declined to explain why they did not remove the dubious random number generator once the flaws became known, [36] [48] or why they did not implement the simple mitigation that NIST added to the standard to neutralize the suggested and later verified backdoor. [36]