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The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a [hard] problem of consciousness. In his "second approximation", he says it is the problem of explaining the behavior of "phenomenal reports", and the behavior of expressing a belief that there is a hard problem of consciousness ...
Neurophenomenology refers to a scientific research program aimed to address the hard problem of consciousness in a pragmatic way. [1] It combines neuroscience with phenomenology in order to study experience, mind, and consciousness with an emphasis on the embodied condition of the human mind. [2]
[1] Is there a "hard problem of consciousness"? If so, how is it solved? Vertiginous question: Why is it that a specific subject of experience is "live" from a given perspective? What, if anything, is the function of consciousness? [2] [3] Problem of mental causation: How exactly do mental states cause intentional actions to happen?
Neutral monism has gained prominence as a potential solution to theoretical issues within the philosophy of mind, specifically the mind–body problem and the hard problem of consciousness. The mind–body problem is the problem of explaining how mind relates to matter. The hard problem is a related philosophical problem targeted at physicalist ...
The hard problem of consciousness is the question of what consciousness is and why we have consciousness as opposed to being philosophical zombies. The adjective "hard" is to contrast with the "easy" consciousness problems, which seek to explain the mechanisms of consciousness ("why" as compared with "how", or final cause versus efficient cause ...
Hutson admires Dehaene's success with neural correlates of consciousness but feels that the hard problem remains unresolved. Like Kalat, Hutson finds Dehaene's dismissal of the hard problem unjustified because consciousness is "unique" in being "inherently private, subjective", unlike other phenomena that can be reductively explained. [3]
David Chalmers argues against quantum consciousness. He instead discusses how quantum mechanics may relate to dualistic consciousness. [61] Chalmers is skeptical that any new physics can resolve the hard problem of consciousness. [62] [63] [64] He argues that quantum theories of consciousness suffer from the same weakness as more conventional ...
The term "new mysterianism" has been extended by some writers to encompass the wider philosophical position that humans do not have the intellectual ability to solve (or comprehend the answers to) many hard problems, not just the problem of consciousness, at a scientific level. [3] This position is also known as anti-constructive naturalism.