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In 2003, philosopher Nick Bostrom proposed the simulation argument, which suggests that if a civilization becomes capable of creating conscious simulations, it could generate so many simulated beings that a randomly chosen conscious entity would almost certainly be in a simulation.
One of the first objections raised by opponents of the Frankfurt-style cases is the two-horned dilemma. This objection was most notably raised by philosophers such as Widerker, Ginet, and Kane. [7] [8] [9] The two-horned dilemma focuses on the connection between the agent's inclination and the agent's decision. This connection can be either ...
Convinced by the argument, Pascal gives the mugger the wallet. In one of Yudkowsky's examples, the mugger succeeds by saying "give me five dollars, or I'll use my magic powers from outside the Matrix to run a Turing machine that simulates and kills 3 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 3 {\displaystyle 3\uparrow \uparrow \uparrow \uparrow 3} people".
Arguments from qualia, such as Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, can be understood as objections to computational theories of mind in this way—though they take aim at physicalist conceptions of the mind in general, and not computational theories specifically. [citation needed]
The argument is directed against the philosophical positions of functionalism and computationalism, [4] which hold that the mind may be viewed as an information-processing system operating on formal symbols, and that simulation of a given mental state is sufficient for its presence.
In the above diagram, box 2.1 represents the inference. This argument uses the inference rule modus ponens, which is written in the inference box. The inference box can be the target of an objection. Such objections are an important part of reasoning, as they highlight invalid or weak inferences. Argument map of an inference objection.
If you’re stuck on today’s Wordle answer, we’re here to help—but beware of spoilers for Wordle 1275 ahead. Let's start with a few hints.
The experience machine or pleasure machine is a thought experiment put forward by philosopher Robert Nozick in his 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia. [1] It is an attempt to refute ethical hedonism by imagining a choice between everyday reality and an apparently preferable simulated reality.