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A computer security model is a scheme for specifying and enforcing security policies. A security model may be founded upon a formal model of access rights, a model of computation, a model of distributed computing, or no particular theoretical grounding at all. A computer security model is implemented through a computer security policy.
This security model, created in 1991 by John McCumber, is depicted as a three-dimensional Rubik's Cube-like grid. The concept of this model is that, in developing information assurance systems, organizations must consider the interconnectedness of all the different factors that impact them.
The model was described in a 1987 paper (A Comparison of Commercial and Military Computer Security Policies) by David D. Clark and David R. Wilson.The paper develops the model as a way to formalize the notion of information integrity, especially as compared to the requirements for multilevel security (MLS) systems described in the Orange Book.
This category contains articles describing computer security models that are or have been used in practical systems or proposed in theory. Subcategories This category has only the following subcategory.
STRIDE is a model for identifying computer security threats [1] developed by Praerit Garg and Loren Kohnfelder at Microsoft. [2] It provides a mnemonic for security threats in six categories. [3] The threats are: Spoofing; Tampering; Repudiation; Information disclosure (privacy breach or data leak) Denial of service; Elevation of privilege [4]
The Bell–LaPadula model (BLP) is a state-machine model used for enforcing access control in government and military applications. [1] It was developed by David Elliott Bell, [2] and Leonard J. LaPadula, subsequent to strong guidance from Roger R. Schell, to formalize the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) multilevel security (MLS) policy.
Mathematically, the security level access may also be expressed in terms of the lattice (a partial order set) where each object and subject have a greatest lower bound (meet) and least upper bound (join) of access rights. For example, if two subjects A and B need access to an object, the security level is defined as the meet of the levels of A ...
Attribute values can be set-valued or atomic-valued. Set-valued attributes contain more than one atomic value. Examples are role and project. Atomic-valued attributes contain only one atomic value. Examples are clearance and sensitivity. Attributes can be compared to static values or to one another, thus enabling relation-based access control.