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The type–token distinction identifies physical objects that are tokens of a particular type of thing. [7] The "type" of which it is a part is in itself an abstract object. The abstract–concrete distinction is often introduced and initially understood in terms of paradigmatic examples of objects of each kind:
Examples are a cloud, a human body, a banana, a billiard ball, a table, or a proton. This is contrasted with abstract objects such as mental objects, which exist in the mental world, and mathematical objects. Other examples that are not physical bodies are emotions, the concept of "justice", a feeling of hatred, or the number "3".
Therefore, it is not opposite day, but if you say it is a normal day it would be considered a normal day, which contradicts the fact that it has previously been stated that it is an opposite day. Richard's paradox: We appear to be able to use simple English to define a decimal expansion in a way that is self-contradictory.
The other version specifically denies the existence of abstract objects as such – objects that do not exist in space and time. [3] Most nominalists have held that only physical particulars in space and time are real, and that universals exist only post res, that is, subsequent to particular things. [4]
It is an example of what might be called the 'Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. ' " [7] Whitehead proposed the fallacy in a discussion of the relation of spatial and temporal location of objects. He rejects the notion that a concrete physical object in the universe can be ascribed a simple spatial or temporal extension , that is, without ...
A physical object (a possible referent of a concept or word) is considered concrete (not abstract) if it is a particular individual that occupies a particular place and time. However, in the secondary sense of the term 'abstraction', this physical object can carry materially abstracting processes.
It is also similar to the term therianthropy; which is the ability to shape shift into animal form, [3] except that with zoomorphism the animal form is applied to a physical object. It means to attribute animal forms or animal characteristics to other animals, or things other than an animal; similar to but broader than anthropomorphism .
A convenient example of what constitutes a non-physical entity is a ghost. Gilbert Ryle once labelled Cartesian dualism as positing the " ghost in the machine ". [ 9 ] [ 10 ] However, it is hard to define in philosophical terms what it is, precisely, about a ghost that makes it a specifically non-physical, rather than a physical entity.