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In philosophy, metaphysical necessity, sometimes called broad logical necessity, [1] is one of many different kinds of necessity, which sits between logical necessity and nomological (or physical) necessity, in the sense that logical necessity entails metaphysical necessity, but not vice versa, and metaphysical necessity entails physical necessity, but not vice versa.
Formally speaking, this type of argument equivocates between the de dicto necessity of a) and the de re necessity of c). The argument is only valid if both a) and c) are construed de re. This, however, would undermine the argument, as a) is only a tautology de dicto – indeed, interpreted de re, it is false. [1]
In logic and mathematics, necessity and sufficiency are terms used to describe a conditional or implicational relationship between two statements. For example, in the conditional statement : "If P then Q ", Q is necessary for P , because the truth of Q is guaranteed by the truth of P .
Oppy admits, however, that not all of the "traditional characteristics" of an ontological argument (i.e. analyticity, necessity, and a priority) are found in all ontological arguments [1] and, in his 2007 work Ontological Arguments and Belief in God, suggested that a better definition of an ontological argument would employ only considerations ...
A cosmological argument can also sometimes be referred to as an argument from universal causation, an argument from first cause, the causal argument or the prime mover argument. The concept of causation is a principal underpinning idea in all cosmological arguments, particularly in affirming the necessity for a First Cause .
Modal logic is a kind of logic used to represent statements about necessity and possibility.It plays a major role in philosophy and related fields as a tool for understanding concepts such as knowledge, obligation, and causation.
Fuller arguments are taken up in later sections of the Summa theologiae, and other publications. For example, in the Summa contra gentiles SCG I, 13, 30, he clarifies that his arguments do not assume or presuppose that there was a first moment in time. A commentator notes that Thomas does not think that God could be first in a temporal sense ...
Morewedge referred to the argument as "Ibn Sina's ontological argument for the existence of God", and said that it was purely based on his analytic specification of this concept [the Necessary Existent]." [28] Steve A. Johnson and Toby Mayer said the argument was a hybrid of the two. [25] [28]