Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
"Hard determinists", such as d'Holbach, are those incompatibilists who accept determinism and reject free will. In contrast, "metaphysical libertarians", such as Thomas Reid, Peter van Inwagen, and Robert Kane, are those incompatibilists who accept free will and deny determinism, holding the view that some form of indeterminism is true. [32]
He suggests free will is denied whether determinism is true or not. He says that if determinism is true, all actions are predicted and no one is assumed to be free; however, if determinism is false, all actions are presumed to be random and as such no one seems free because they have no part in controlling what happens.
Free-will libertarianism is the view that the free-will thesis (that we, ordinary humans, have free will) is true and that determinism is false; in first-order language, it is the view that we (ordinary humans) have free will and the world does not behave in the way described by determinism.
An agent could have done otherwise only if causal determinism is false. Therefore, an agent is responsible for an action only if causal determinism is false. Traditionally, compatibilists (defenders of the compatibility of free will and causal determinism, like A. J. Ayer, Walter Terence Stace, and Daniel Dennett) reject premise two
Hard determinism (or metaphysical determinism) is a view on free will which holds that determinism is true, that it is incompatible with free will, and therefore that free will does not exist. Although hard determinism generally refers to nomological determinism , [ 1 ] it can also be a position taken with respect to other forms of determinism ...
Libertarianism is one of the main philosophical positions related to the problems of free will and determinism which are part of the larger domain of metaphysics. [1] In particular, libertarianism is an incompatibilist position [2] [3] which argues that free will is logically incompatible with a deterministic universe. Libertarianism states ...
[19] – Nietzsche criticizes the idea of "free choice", and even of "choice" in general (cf. the end of above quotation): man does not want to "choose", man wants to affirm himself ("will to power"). [20] Another problem is the role of chance. Unless the change brought to man is too big, a chance is generally responded by will, wherever there ...
Free will in antiquity is a philosophical and theological concept. Free will in antiquity was not discussed in the same terms as used in the modern free will debates, but historians of the problem have speculated who exactly was first to take positions as determinist, libertarian, and compatibilist in antiquity. [1]