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An "instrumental rationalist" is a decision expert whose response to seeing a man engaged in slicing his toes [the man’s value rational fact-free end] with a blunt knife [the man’s instrumental value-free means] is to rush to advise him that he should use a sharper knife to better serve [instrumentally] his evident [value rational] objective.
"Instrumental" and "value-rational action" are terms scholars use to identify two kinds of behavior that humans can engage in. Scholars call using means that "work" as tools, instrumental action, and pursuing ends that are "right" as legitimate ends, value-rational action.
In moral philosophy, instrumental and intrinsic value are the distinction between what is a means to an end and what is as an end in itself. [1] Things are deemed to have instrumental value (or extrinsic value [2]) if they help one achieve a particular end; intrinsic values, by contrast, are understood to be desirable in and of themselves. A ...
Intrinsic and instrumental value are not exclusive categories. As a result, a thing can have both intrinsic and instrumental value if it is both good in itself while also leading to other good things. [28] In a similar sense, a thing can have different instrumental values at the same time, both positive and negative ones.
According to Habermas, the "substantive" (i.e. formally and semantically integrated) rationality that characterized pre-modern worldviews has, since modern times, been emptied of its content and divided into three purely "formal" realms: (1) cognitive-instrumental reason; (2) moral-practical reason; and (3) aesthetic-expressive reason.
Instrumental value conditionality in this case could be exampled by every waffle not present, making them less valued by being far away rather than easily accessible. In many life stances it is the product of value and intensity that is ultimately desirable, i.e. not only to generate value, but to generate it in large degree.
From January 2008 to December 2012, if you bought shares in companies when Charlotte Guyman joined the board, and sold them when she left, you would have a -5.6 percent return on your investment, compared to a -2.8 percent return from the S&P 500.
Argumentation theorists have identified two kinds of practical reasoning: instrumental practical reasoning that does not explicitly take values into account, [2] and value-based practical reasoning. [3] The following argumentation scheme for instrumental practical reasoning is given in Walton, Reed & Macagno (2008).