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The subgame perfect equilibrium in addition to the Nash equilibrium requires that the strategy also is a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of that game. This eliminates all non-credible threats , that is, strategies that contain non-rational moves in order to make the counter-player change their strategy.
Nash equilibrium, the basic solution concept in game theory Quasi-perfect equilibrium, a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for extensive form games due to Eric van Damme; Sequential equilibrium, a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for games of incomplete information due to David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson; Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a refinement ...
The solutions are normally based on the concept of Nash equilibrium, and these solutions are reached by using methods listed in Solution concept. Most solutions used in non-cooperative game are refinements developed from Nash equilibrium, including the minimax mixed-strategy proved by John von Neumann. [8] [13] [20]
The decision of each player can be viewed as determining two angles. Symmetric Nash equilibria that attain a payoff value of / for each player is shown, and each player volunteers at this Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, these Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal. It is shown that the payoff function of Nash equilibria in the quantum setting is ...
A common assumption is that players act rationally. In non-cooperative games, the most famous of these is the Nash equilibrium. A set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if each represents a best response to the other strategies. If all the players are playing the strategies in a Nash equilibrium, they have no unilateral incentive to deviate ...
The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is inefficient: the players will miscoordinate with probability 13/25, leaving each player with an expected return of 6/5 (less than the payoff of 2 from each's less favored pure strategy equilibrium). It remains unclear how expectations would form that would result in a particular equilibrium being played out.
The unique stage game Nash equilibrium must be played in the last round regardless of what happened in earlier rounds. Knowing this, players have no incentive to deviate from the unique stage game Nash equilibrium in the second-to-last round, and so on this logic is applied back to the first round of the game. [2]
A pure Nash Equilibrium is when no one can gain a higher payoff by deviating from their move, provided others stick with their original choices. Nash equilibria are self-enforcing contracts, in which negotiation happens prior to the game being played in which each player best sticks with their negotiated move.