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Searle's work on speech acts is understood to further refine Austin's conception. However, some philosophers have pointed out a significant difference between the two conceptions: whereas Austin emphasized the conventional interpretation of speech acts, Searle emphasized a psychological interpretation (based on beliefs, intentions, etc.). [12]
Searle (1975) set up the following classification of illocutionary speech acts: assertives = speech acts that commit a speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition; directives = speech acts that are to cause the hearer to take a particular action, e.g. requests, commands and advice; commissives = speech acts that commit a speaker to some ...
Searle maintained that even if one was to see a written statement with no knowledge of authorship it would still be impossible to escape the question of intentionality, because "a meaningful sentence is just a standing possibility of the (intentional) speech act". For Searle, ascribing intentionality to a statement was a basic requirement for ...
Searle further claimed that performatives are what he calls declarations; this is a technical notion of Searle's account: according to his conception, an utterance is a declaration, if "the successful performance of the speech act is sufficient to bring about the fit between words and world, to make the propositional content true."
The performance of these three acts is the performance of a locution—it is the act of saying something. John has therefore performed a locutionary act. He has also done at least two other things: he has asked a question of, and elicited an answer from, Sue; in so doing, he has performed two further speech-acts, as Austin would have it:
The term direction of fit is used in the philosophy of intentionality to distinguish between types of representations.It is commonly applied in two related senses: first, to distinguish the mental states of belief and desire; [1] and second, to distinguish between types of linguistic utterances, such as indicative and imperative sentences.
Propositional content condition: the requested act is a future act of the hearer; Preparatory precondition: 1) the speaker believes the hearer can perform the requested act; 2) it is not obvious that the hearer would perform the requested act without being asked; Sincerity condition: the speaker genuinely wants the hearer to perform the ...
John Searle has used the theory of speech acts to explore the nature of social/institutional reality, so as to describe such aspects of social reality which he instances under the rubrics of "marriage, property, hiring, firing, war, revolutions, cocktail parties, governments, meetings, unions, parliaments, corporations, laws, restaurants ...