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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (officially abbreviated Fed. R. Civ. P.; colloquially FRCP) ... a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment is used. ...
Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317 (1986), was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court . Written by Associate Justice William Rehnquist , the decision of the Court held that a party moving for summary judgment need show only that the opposing party lacks evidence sufficient to ...
At the federal level, a summary-judgment motion in United States District Court is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Other pretrial motions, such as a "motion for judgment on the pleadings" or a "motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted", can be converted by the judge to summary ...
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), [1] was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States interpreted Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) [2] to require that federal courts grant a party leave to amend a pleading absent special circumstances such as bad faith or prejudice to the opposing party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), is a United States Supreme Court case articulating the standard for a trial court to grant summary judgment.Summary judgment will lie when, taking all factual inferences in the non-movant's favor, there exists no genuine issue as to a material fact and the movant deserves judgment as a matter of law.
In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. One goal of these rules was to relax the strict rules of code pleading. [2] The focus of the cause of action was shifted to discovery (another goal of the FRCP). [2] Under the Federal Rules, a plaintiff's complaint merely needs to contain a short and plain statement of their cause of ...
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), was a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States involving antitrust law and civil procedure.Authored by Justice David Souter, it established that parallel conduct, absent evidence of agreement, is insufficient to sustain an antitrust action under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Massachusetts rule at the time required personal service of process on the executor of an in-state defendant, while Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (d)(1) required only that service be made on a competent adult who resides at the residence of the defendant. The plaintiff left process at the residence of the executor, and so complied with the federal rule ...