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In 2003, philosopher Nick Bostrom proposed the simulation argument, which suggests that if a civilization becomes capable of creating conscious simulations, it could generate so many simulated beings that a randomly chosen conscious entity would almost certainly be in a simulation.
The self-indication assumption doomsday argument rebuttal is an objection to the doomsday argument (that there is only a 5% chance of more than twenty times the historic number of humans ever being born) by arguing that the chance of being born is not one, but is an increasing function of the number of people who will be born.
An argument map with 'modus ponens' in the inference box. An inference can be the target of an objection. Such inference objections highlight invalid or weak inferences. [12] [13] In the diagram below, B is the premise, A is the conclusion, and C is an objection to the inference from A to B. Argument map of an inference objection.
An inference objection is an objection to an argument based not on any of its stated premises, but rather on the relationship between a premise (or set of premises) and main contention. [ 4 ] [ 5 ] For a given simple argument, if the assumption is made that its premises are correct, fault may be found in the progression from these to the ...
While the computer metaphor draws an analogy between the mind as software and the brain as hardware, CTM is the claim that the mind is a computational system. More specifically, it states that a computational simulation of a mind is sufficient for the actual presence of a mind, and that a mind truly can be simulated computationally.
The argument is directed against the philosophical positions of functionalism and computationalism, [4] which hold that the mind may be viewed as an information-processing system operating on formal symbols, and that simulation of a given mental state is sufficient for its presence.
One of the first objections raised by opponents of the Frankfurt-style cases is the two-horned dilemma. This objection was most notably raised by philosophers such as Widerker, Ginet, and Kane. [7] [8] [9] The two-horned dilemma focuses on the connection between the agent's inclination and the agent's decision. This connection can be either ...
To decide if an argument can be accepted or not, or if several arguments can be accepted together, Dung defines several semantics of acceptance that allows, given an argumentation system, sets of arguments (called extensions) to be computed. For instance, given = , ,