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In information security, computer science, and other fields, the principle of least privilege (PoLP), also known as the principle of minimal privilege (PoMP) or the principle of least authority (PoLA), requires that in a particular abstraction layer of a computing environment, every module (such as a process, a user, or a program, depending on the subject) must be able to access only the ...
The Bell–LaPadula model (BLP) is a state-machine model used for enforcing access control in government and military applications. [1] It was developed by David Elliott Bell, [2] and Leonard J. LaPadula, subsequent to strong guidance from Roger R. Schell, to formalize the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) multilevel security (MLS) policy.
The two-person rule is a control mechanism designed to achieve a high level of security for especially critical material or operations. Under this rule, access and actions require the presence of two or more authorized people at all times.
A new rule posted said the Capitol complex grounds would be closed from 11 p.m. to 6 a.m., but as of midnight no action was taken against those in line New security rule posted at the Capitol ...
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996; Other short titles: Kassebaum–Kennedy Act, Kennedy–Kassebaum Act: Long title: An Act To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care delivery, to promote the use ...
The rule, unveiled in April as the "Retirement Security Rule," was challenged by insurance groups who argued it conflicted with ERISA, or the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.
The Biba Model or Biba Integrity Model developed by Kenneth J. Biba in 1975, [1] is a formal state transition system of computer security policy describing a set of access control rules designed to ensure data integrity. Data and subjects are grouped into ordered levels of integrity.
A generalization some make from Kerckhoffs's principle is: "The fewer and simpler the secrets that one must keep to ensure system security, the easier it is to maintain system security." Bruce Schneier ties it in with a belief that all security systems must be designed to fail as gracefully as possible: