Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
[note 2] The Borda count was the sole method used for membership election to the Academy from 1795 until 1800, when it was supplemented by other methods at the urging of Napoleon. Charles L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll, 1832–1898) proposed a version of the Borda count in "A discussion of the various methods of procedure in conducting elections ...
Instant-runoff voting, the Kemeny-Young method, Minimax Condorcet, Ranked Pairs, top-two runoff, First-past-the-post, and the Schulze method all elect B in the scenario above, and thus fail IIA after C is removed. The Borda count and Bucklin voting both elect C in the scenario above, and thus fail IIA after A is removed.
The conclusions from the study are hard to summarise, but the Borda count performed badly; Minimax was somewhat vulnerable; and IRV was highly resistant. The authors showed that limiting any method to elections with no Condorcet winner (choosing the Condorcet winner when there was one) would never increase its susceptibility to tactical voting ...
The Borda count is a weighted-rank system that assigns scores to each candidate based on their position in each ballot. If m is the total number of candidates, the candidate ranked first on a ballot receives m − 1 points, the second receives m − 2 , and so on, until the last-ranked candidate who receives zero.
Instant runoff (IRV), minimax and the Borda count are natural tie-breaks. The first two are not frequently advocated for this use but are sometimes discussed in connection with Smith's method where similar considerations apply. Dasgupta and Maskin proposed the Borda count as a Copeland tie-break: this is known as the Dasgupta-Maskin method. [11]
k-Borda: each voter gives, to each committee member, his Borda count. Each voter ranks the candidates and the rankings are scored together. The k candidates with the highest total Borda score are elected. Borda-Chamberlin-Courant (BCC): each voter gives, to each committee, the Borda count of his most preferred candidate in the committee. [12]
With the Borda count A would get 23 points (5×3+4×1+2×2), B would get 24 points, and C would get 19 points, so B would be elected. In instant-runoff, C would be eliminated in the first round and A would be elected in the second round by 7 votes to 4. Now reversing the preferences: 5 voters prefer C then B then A; 4 voters prefer A then C then B
The Borda count, minimax, Kemeny–Young, Copeland's method, plurality, and the two-round system all fail the independence of clones criterion. Voting methods that limit the number of allowed ranks also fail the criterion, because the addition of clones can leave voters with insufficient space to express their preferences about other candidates.