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The gambler's fallacy, also known as the Monte Carlo fallacy or the fallacy of the maturity of chances, is the belief that, if an event (whose occurrences are independent and identically distributed) has occurred less frequently than expected, it is more likely to happen again in the future (or vice versa).
Berkson's paradox, the tendency to misinterpret statistical experiments involving conditional probabilities. [ 65 ] Escalation of commitment , irrational escalation, or sunk cost fallacy , where people justify increased investment in a decision, based on the cumulative prior investment, despite new evidence suggesting that the decision was ...
The neglect of probability, a type of cognitive bias, is the tendency to disregard probability when making a decision under uncertainty and is one simple way in which people regularly violate the normative rules for decision making.
Peirce held that science achieves statistical probabilities, not certainties, and that spontaneity ("absolute chance") is real (see Tychism on his view). Most of his statistical writings promote the frequency interpretation of probability (objective ratios of cases), and many of his writings express skepticism about (and criticize the use of ...
For example, if it is unknown whether or not it will rain tomorrow, then there is a state of uncertainty. If probabilities are applied to the possible outcomes using weather forecasts or even just a calibrated probability assessment, the uncertainty has been quantified. Suppose it is quantified as a 90% chance of sunshine.
The law of truly large numbers (a statistical adage), attributed to Persi Diaconis and Frederick Mosteller, states that with a large enough number of independent samples, any highly implausible (i.e. unlikely in any single sample, but with constant probability strictly greater than 0 in any sample) result is likely to be observed. [1]
"An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances" is a work on the mathematical theory of probability by Thomas Bayes, published in 1763, [1] two years after its author's death, and containing multiple amendments and additions due to his friend Richard Price.
An inductive argument affirms, not that a certain matter of fact is so, but that relative to certain evidence there is a probability in its favour. The validity of the induction, relative to the original evidence, is not upset, therefore, if, as a fact, the truth turns out to be otherwise. [20] This approach was endorsed by Bertrand Russell. [21]