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A first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSBA) is a common type of auction. It is also known as blind auction. [1] In this type of auction, all bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids so that no bidder knows the bid of any other participant. The highest bidder pays the price that was submitted. [2]: p2 [3]
Under CICA all procurements must be competed as full and open (there are some exceptions found in FAR Part 6) so that any qualified company can submit an offer. The bidding procedure should take the form of sealed bidding, previously known as "formal advertising", [2] solicited prior to 2001 through Commerce Business Daily. [3]
Each buyer is allowed to declare more than one bid, since its willingness-to-pay per unit might be different depending on the total number of units it receives. Bidders cannot see other people's bids at any moment since they are sealed (only visible to the auction system). Once all the bids are made, the auction is closed.
This allows sealed-bid first-price auctions to produce higher expected revenue than English and sealed-bid second-price auctions. In formats with correlated values —where the bidders' valuations of the item are not independent—one of the bidders, perceiving their valuation of the item to be high, makes it more likely that the other bidders ...
In an English auction, all current bids are visible to all bidders and in a sealed-bid auction, bidders only get to know if their bid was the best. Best/not best auctions are sealed-bid auctions with multiple bids, where the bidders submit their prices like in English auction and get responses about the leadership of their bid. [74]
The bidding ends once no one is willing to underbid the current price. A different option is the English Ticker which gradually declines the starting price by a predefined price interval. To make a bid, the price step has to be confirmed by the supplier. Also a First-price sealed-bid auction is possible. In this case, the suppliers make only ...
We now argue that in the sealed first price auction the equilibrium bid of a buyer with valuation is B ( v ) = e ( v ) = 1 2 v . {\displaystyle B(v)=e(v)={\tfrac {1}{2}}v.} That is, the payment of the winner in the sealed first-price auction is equal to the expected revenue in the sealed second-price auction.
The generalized second-price auction (GSP) is a non-truthful auction mechanism for multiple items. Each bidder places a bid. The highest bidder gets the first slot, the second-highest, the second slot and so on, but the highest bidder pays the price bid by the second-highest bidder, the second-highest pays the price bid by the third-highest, and so on.