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Deterrence in an international relations context is the application of deterrence theory to avoid conflict. Deterrence is widely defined as any use of threats (implicit or explicit) or limited force intended to dissuade an actor from taking an action (i.e. maintain the status quo).
Durkheim (1960) argued that denunciation was a form of education in that punishment "reinforce(s) the conscience collective of society and thereby ensure(s) that members of society continued to refrain from crime". This is a forward looking or utilitarian approach which is similar to the concept of deterrence. [3]
General deterrence is the intention to deter the general public from committing crime by punishing those who do offend. When an offender is punished by, for example, being sent to prison, a clear message is sent to the rest of society that behaviour of this sort will result in an unpleasant response from the criminal justice system.
Deterrence may refer to: Deterrence theory, a theory of war, especially regarding nuclear weapons; Deterrence (penology), a theory of justice; Deterrence (psychology), a psychological theory; Deterrence, a 1999 drama starring Kevin Pollak, depicting fictional events about nuclear brinkmanship
This theory emerged at the time of the Enlightenment and it contended that it should focus on rationality. But, because it lacks sophistication, it was the operationalised in a mechanical way, assuming that there is a mathematics of deterrence, i.e. a proportional calculation undertaken first by policy makers and then by potential offenders.
Deterrence is widely defined as any use of threats (implicit or explicit) or limited force intended to dissuade an actor from taking an action (i.e. maintain the status quo). [16] [17] Most of the innovative work on deterrence theory occurred from the late 1940s to mid-1960s. [18]
The 1964 film Dr. Strangelove satirizes game theoretic ideas about deterrence theory. For example, nuclear deterrence depends on the threat to retaliate catastrophically if a nuclear attack is detected. A game theorist might argue that such threats can fail to be credible, in the sense that they can lead to subgame imperfect equilibria. The ...
The examples and perspective in this article deal primarily with the United States and do not represent a worldwide view of the subject. You may improve this article, discuss the issue on the talk page, or create a new article, as appropriate.