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The Court of Appeal held that the father could demand return of the shares, because his illegal scheme had not in fact been carried into effect. Millett LJ said it was true that an illegal purpose cannot rebut the presumption of advancement, but because the illegal purpose had not been carried out, the father was not precluded of pleading the purpose to claim a resulting trust.
A resulting trust is an implied trust that comes into existence by operation of law, where property is transferred to someone who pays nothing for it; and then is implied to hold the property for the benefit of another person. The trust property is said to "result" or revert to the transferor (as an implied settlor).
In my view that is the position here. As it was a loan, I think it is quite inconsistent with that to say that it could create a resulting trust at the same time. I accept as a correct statement of law the short passage in Underhill's Law of Trusts and Trustees, 12th ed. (1970), p. 210, in these words: [2]
Personal trust law developed in England at the time of the Crusades, during the 12th and 13th centuries. In medieval English trust law, the settlor was known as the feoffor to uses, while the trustee was known as the feoffee to uses, and the beneficiary was known as the cestui que use, or cestui que trust.
The council contended that on traditional trust law principles there could be no resulting trust (and therefore no property right, and compound interest) because the council's conscience could not be affected when it could not know (before the judgment in Hazell) that the contract was void. A resulting trust needed to be linked to a deemed ...
[10] Resulting trusts work on a principle of "common intention". This is the idea that a resulting trust is a mix of the settlor's intention, and the trustee's knowledge that he is not intended to be the beneficiary. In Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd, [11] Gibson J expressed the principle as:
By contrast, Lord Hoffmann characterised the trust as being an express, rather than a resulting trust. Although there may not have been words used to this effect, the solicitor's undertaking that the money should only be used for one purpose so that the money is not at the borrower's free disposal, was sufficient intent to create a trust.
It ceases to exist whenever that gap is filled by someone becoming beneficially entitled. As soon as the gap is filled by the creation or declaration of a valid trust, the resulting trust comes to an end. In this case, before the option was exercised, there was a gap in the beneficial ownership. So there was a resulting trust for Mr Vandervell.