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Steven J. Brams (born November 28, 1940, in Concord, New Hampshire) is an American game theorist and political scientist at the New York University Department of Politics. . Brams is best known for using the techniques of game theory, public choice theory, and social choice theory to analyze voting systems and fair divi
The application of game theory to political science is focused in the overlapping areas of fair division, political economy, public choice, war bargaining, positive political theory, and social choice theory. In each of these areas, researchers have developed game-theoretic models in which the players are often voters, states, special interest ...
John Harsanyi – equilibrium theory (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1994) Monika Henzinger – algorithmic game theory and information retrieval; John Hicks – general equilibrium theory (including Kaldor–Hicks efficiency) Naira Hovakimyan – differential games and adaptive control; Peter L. Hurd – evolution of aggressive ...
A simple magic square game demonstrating nonclassical correlations was introduced by P.K. Aravind [3] based on a series of papers by N. David Mermin [4] [5] and Asher Peres [6] and Adán Cabello [7] [8] that developed simplifying demonstrations of Bell's theorem. The game has been reformulated to demonstrate quantum pseudo-telepathy. [9]
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, published in 1944 [1] by Princeton University Press, is a book by mathematician John von Neumann and economist Oskar Morgenstern which is considered the groundbreaking text that created the interdisciplinary research field of game theory.
Aumann was the first to define the concept of correlated equilibrium in game theory, which is a type of equilibrium in non-cooperative games that is more flexible than the classical Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, Aumann has introduced the first purely formal account of the notion of common knowledge in game theory.
Combinatorial game theory has a different emphasis than "traditional" or "economic" game theory, which was initially developed to study games with simple combinatorial structure, but with elements of chance (although it also considers sequential moves, see extensive-form game).
In game theory, fictitious play is a learning rule first introduced by George W. Brown. In it, each player presumes that the opponents are playing stationary (possibly mixed) strategies. In it, each player presumes that the opponents are playing stationary (possibly mixed) strategies.