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The bar mitzvah attack is an attack on the SSL/TLS protocols that exploits the use of the RC4 cipher with weak keys for that cipher. [1] [2] While this affects only the first hundred or so bytes of only the very small fraction of connections that happen to use weak keys, it allows significant compromise of user security, for example by allowing the interception of password information [2 ...
After the vulnerability is patched, server administrators must address the potential breach of confidentiality. Because Heartbleed allowed attackers to disclose private keys, they must be treated as compromised; key pairs must be regenerated, and certificates that use them must be reissued; the old certificates must be revoked.
A workaround for SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0, roughly equivalent to random IVs from TLS 1.1, was widely adopted by many implementations in late 2011. [30] In 2014, the POODLE vulnerability of SSL 3.0 was discovered, which takes advantage of the known vulnerabilities in CBC, and an insecure fallback negotiation used in browsers. [31]
Although this vulnerability only exists in SSL 3.0 and most clients and servers support TLS 1.0 and above, all major browsers voluntarily downgrade to SSL 3.0 if the handshakes with newer versions of TLS fail unless they provide the option for a user or administrator to disable SSL 3.0 and the user or administrator does so [citation needed].
The SSL certificate allowed the application to decrypt outgoing traffic to analyse it. [19] Once the new SSL certificate was installed, the application alerted Equifax's employees to suspicious network activity. The certificate had been expired for nine months. [20] By July 30, Equifax shut off the exploit. [14]
A Lucky Thirteen attack is a cryptographic timing attack against implementations of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol that use the CBC mode of operation, first reported in February 2013 by its developers Nadhem J. AlFardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London. [1] [2]
It expands on static certificate pinning, which hardcodes public key hashes of well-known websites or services within web browsers and applications. [5] Most browsers disable pinning for certificate chains with private root certificates to enable various corporate content inspection scanners [6] and web debugging tools (such as mitmproxy or ...
The OCSP responder uses the certificate serial number to look up the revocation status of Alice's certificate. The OCSP responder looks in a CA database that Carol maintains. In this scenario, Carol's CA database is the only trusted location where a compromise to Alice's certificate would be recorded.