Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
The Borda count has been proposed as a rank aggregation method in information retrieval, in which documents are ranked according to multiple criteria and the resulting rankings are then combined into a composite ranking. In this method, the ranking criteria are treated as voters, and the aggregate ranking is the result of applying the Borda ...
Instant-runoff voting, the Kemeny-Young method, Minimax Condorcet, Ranked Pairs, top-two runoff, First-past-the-post, and the Schulze method all elect B in the scenario above, and thus fail IIA after C is removed. The Borda count and Bucklin voting both elect C in the scenario above, and thus fail IIA after A is removed.
Ranked voting systems, such as Borda count, are usually contrasted with rated voting methods, which allow voters to indicate how strongly they support different candidates (e.g. on a scale from 0 to 10). [2] Ranked vote systems produce more information than X voting systems such as first-past-the-post voting.
This method is more favourable to candidates with many first preferences than the conventional Borda count. It has been described as a system "somewhere between plurality and the Borda count, but as veering more towards plurality". [5] Simulations show that 30% of Nauru elections would produce different outcomes if counted using standard Borda ...
The Borda count, minimax, Kemeny–Young, Copeland's method, plurality, and the two-round system all fail the independence of clones criterion. Voting methods that limit the number of allowed ranks also fail the criterion, because the addition of clones can leave voters with insufficient space to express their preferences about other candidates.
Methods that satisfy reversal symmetry include the Borda count, ranked pairs, Kemeny–Young, and Schulze. Most rated voting systems, including approval and score voting, satisfy the criterion as well. Best-is-worst paradoxes can occur in ranked-choice runoff voting (RCV) and minimax.
The conclusions from the study are hard to summarise, but the Borda count performed badly; Minimax was somewhat vulnerable; and IRV was highly resistant. The authors showed that limiting any method to elections with no Condorcet winner (choosing the Condorcet winner when there was one) would never increase its susceptibility to tactical voting .
Compliant methods include: two-round system, instant-runoff voting (AV), contingent vote, borda count, Schulze method, ranked pairs, and Kemeny-Young method.Any voting method that ends in a runoff passes the criterion, so long as all voters are able to express their preferences in that runoff i.e. STAR voting passes only when voters can always indicate their ranked preference in their scores ...