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In information security, computer science, and other fields, the principle of least privilege (PoLP), also known as the principle of minimal privilege (PoMP) or the principle of least authority (PoLA), requires that in a particular abstraction layer of a computing environment, every module (such as a process, a user, or a program, depending on the subject) must be able to access only the ...
A common method to implement privilege separation is to have a computer program fork into two processes. The main program drops privileges, and the smaller program keeps privileges in order to perform a certain task. The two halves then communicate via a socket pair. Thus, any successful attack against the larger program will gain minimal ...
Separation of privilege: Where feasible, a protection mechanism that requires two keys to unlock it is more robust and flexible than one that allows access to the presenter of only a single key. Least privilege: Every program and every user of the system should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job.
Normally, applications use system.privilege.admin, but another may be used, such as a lower right for security, or a higher right if higher access is needed. If the right the application has is not suitable for a task, the application may need to authenticate again to increase the privilege level.
Tasks are tagged with a privilege level. Resources (segments, pages, ports, etc.) and the privileged instructions are tagged with a demanded privilege level. When a task tries to use a resource, or execute a privileged instruction, the processor determines whether it has the permission (if not, a "protection fault" interrupt is generated).
In the original example of a confused deputy, [3] there was a compiler program provided on a commercial timesharing service. Users could run the compiler and optionally specify a filename where it would write debugging output, and the compiler would be able to write to that file if the user had permission to write there.
Advantages that motivate object-oriented programming, such as encapsulation or information hiding, modularity, and separation of concerns, correspond to security goals such as least privilege and privilege separation in capability-based programming. [1] [2] The object-capability model was first proposed by Jack Dennis and Earl C. Van Horn in ...
A large amount of existing software doesn't run well as a standard user, due to developers not implementing the principle of least privilege in their design and testing. For example, many poorly written applications often assume incorrectly that they will have read and write access to the entire filesystem and system Registry. [8]